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Abstract 
I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction 
(or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism 
and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive sci-
ence. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of 
representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also reca-
pitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one 
can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations 
of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limita-
tions are here taken as opportunities for reflecting on the fate of enactivism in 
its relations with representationalism and anti-representationalism.  
Keywords: natural content; mental representation; representationalism; enac-
tivism; anti-representationalism; theoretical terms; eliminativism.  
 
Introduction 
The criticism and the rejection of representationalism have a particular status 
in enactivism (or enaction). The definition of cognition as embodied action was 
explicitly proposed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in their seminal The Em-
bodied Mind as an alternative to the definition of cognition as “the representa-
tion of a world that is independent of our perceptual and cognitive capacities 
by a cognitive system that exists independent of the world” (1991: xx). Still, if 
we are looking nowadays for a more positive definition of enaction, concepts 
such as autonomy, autopoiesis, embodiment, structural coupling, sense-making, 
life-mind continuity, or lived experience immediately and eminently come to 
the fore, somehow leaving the criticism of representationalism in the back-
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ground17. It is true that the unpacking of the meanings of these concepts often 
carries or implies an implicit criticism of representationalism as the one men-
tioned above, and is very helpful for contrasting enactivism with other non-
representationalist theories of cognition such as radical embodied cognitive 
science (Chemero 2009). Nevertheless, enactivists would be wrong to consider 
that developing an explicit criticism of representationalism was only neces-
sary when enaction emerged as an alternative theory (or even paradigm) to 
cognitivism, where the concept of “mental representation” was—and is still—
a basic building block. Strategically, the rejection of representationalism con-
tinues to mark an important difference not only between enactivism and cog-
nitivism (i.e. the computo-representational theory of mind), but also between 
(some forms of) enactivism and other more recent theories that criticize, 
amend or even reject the intellectualist, internalist or formalist dimensions of 
the computo-representational theory of mind… by often retaining representa-
tionalism. Amongst these recent theories, one can include distributed cogni-
tion (Hutchins 1995), situated cognition (Clancey 1997), extended cognition 
(Clark 2008), and interactivism (Bickhard 2009)18. More fundamentally, the 
permanent rejection of representationalism should not be taken as an easy 
task: representationalism is a polymorphous and plastic thesis, sometimes 
looking like a Lernaean Hydra: shallow and maximalist versions of represen-
tationalism are easy to see and to dislodge, but only at the benefit of other 
versions which are much more tenacious, refined and pervasive. It is the im-
plicit endorsement of these latter versions that may explain why some au-
thors propose “enactive” accounts of mental representations (Ellis and New-
ton 2010), or that some reviewers of the enactivist literature state that “noth-
ing in the enactivist view requires abandonment of contentful states” (Shapiro 
2014). 
Let us take some examples, by contrasting three different understandings of 
what anti-representationalism may amount to: 
(1) Cognition and cognitive phenomena such as perception, language-
understanding or problem-solving are not representational, in the sense 
of being functionally isolated from action or from the active and embod-
ied engagement of cognitive creatures in the world; 
(2) Cognition and cognitive phenomena such as perception, language-
understanding or problem-solving are not representational, in the sense 
of consisting in the manufacture, the manipulation or the retrieval of 
                                                             
17 See for instance the contributions in the book edited by Stewart, Gapenne and Di Paolo 2010. 
18 In a recent paper (Steiner 2014), I have even argued that the extension of cognition in the world 
(and not only in bodily engagements with the world) is very restrained if representationalism 
(even minimal) is retained.  
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symbolic, abstract, action-neutral and detailed mental representations 
of the environment; 
(3) Cognition and cognitive phenomena such as perception, language-
understanding or problem-solving are not representational, in the sense 
of involving the manufacture, the manipulation or the retrieval of men-
tal representations as contentful physical structures (be they intracrani-
al or distributed across brain, body and world), whatever their formats 
and roles in cognitive processing.  
(1) concerns the role of representation in the definition of cognitive phenome-
na, (2) concerns the formats and the properties of mental representations, 
whereas (3) is about the very existence of mental representations (whatever 
their roles, properties and formats). Endorsing (1) and (2) is not sufficient for 
endorsing (3). Indeed, most if not all enactivists will clearly endorse (1) and 
(2), but they will not be alone doing so: many friends of 3E-embodied, embed-
ded, extended-cognition, including situated cognition and distributed cogni-
tion will also endorse (1) and (2). One might expect that the difference is or at 
least should be made in the endorsement of (3). Still, most if not all enactivists 
may find (3) to be too brutal or radical, since (3) denies that there are any 
mental representations involved in cognitive processes. For instance, after 
making it clear that he argues “against representationalist theories that sepa-
rate perception and action (…) and that neglect the ways autonomous agents 
bring forth or enact meaning in perception and action” Evan Thompson (2011: 
194) expresses his sympathy for mental representations as they are defined in 
the emulation theory of mental imagery (Foglia & Grush 2011). Another ex-
ample can be found in O’Regan and Noë’s “A sensorimotor account of vision 
and visual consciousness”: the authors reject the claim that vision requires the 
production or use of detailed representations, but they still accept that the 
visual system stores and uses information, and that “seeing lies in the making 
use of the representation, not in the having of the representation” (2001: 1017; 
their emphasis). Finally, (3) might be associated with what Dan Hutto and Erik 
Myin (2013) name “really radical enactivism”, a position they do not claim to 
endorse (2013: xviii). For “really radical enactivism”, cognition never involves 
representational content. The basic claim of Hutto and Myin’s radical enactiv-
ism is rather that only basic cognition (typically exemplified in perceptual 
experience, sensori-motor coordination, reaching and grasping, or keeping 
track of another’s gaze) is not contentful or representational, even if it exhib-
its intentional directedness. Their non-endorsement of (3) is thus different 
from the non-endorsement of (3) as we can find it in Noë and Thompson: Hut-
to and Myin endorse (3) for what they call “basic cognition”, but not for other 
forms of cognition (such as cases of linguistic judgments or intelligent plan-
ning (2013: 40-41)); whereas Noë and Thompson do not claim that basic cogni-
tion is non-representational. Radical enactivism admits that enculturated or 
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linguistically-scaffolded minds may be informed by or involve contents or 
mental representations (Hutto and Myin 2013: ix: xviii: 82).  
Consider representationalism as being the existential claim that there are 
mental representations as contentful physical structures playing a role in cogni-
tive processing. One might think that the radicality of radical enactivism con-
sists in the fact it rejects representationalism as applied to basic cognition 
(non-radical versions of enactivism, like Thompson or Noë, do not do that). 
But this characterization of the radicality of radical enactivism presupposes 
that a clear line could be drawn between basic cognition and other kinds of 
cognition, and that this line parallels the “non-representational/repre-
sentational” distinction. In the case of human cognition at least, it is question-
able that basic cognition does not involve representational content: if basic 
cognition is acquired and exercised in socio-cultural practices, there are good 
reasons to think—if we follow Hutto and Myin—that it is contentful, so that 
the non-representational dimensions of basic cognition would be very mar-
ginal. Because of this possible difficulty of the distinction between basic cogni-
tion and non-basic cognition, I think it is preferable to underline and to define 
the radicality of radical enactivism alternatively. 
If representationalism is very basically defined as the existential claim that 
there are mental representations as contentful physical structures playing a role 
in cognitive processing, the following table can be helpful for summarizing the 
current situation: 
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Table 1 
By looking at this chart, one may note that radical enactivism is rejecting 
a very basic kind of representationalism which is logically narrower than the 
representationalism just defined above, but which also constitutes the core 
assumption of the great majority of actual versions of representationalism: 
the existential claim that there are mental representations, defined as physical 
structures (vehicles) playing a role in cognitive processing in virtue of some 
content whose existence does not depend on the existence of social and linguistic 
practices and on the ability of the organism to take part in those practices19. 
Typically, these mental representations consist in subpersonal and intracrani-
al processes that are naturally or intrinsically contentful20. Radical enactivism 
refuses that idea by arguing that 
contents and vehicles exist, but they are associated with linguistic symbols and 
forms of cognition that feature in and are logically and developmentally de-
pendent upon shared, scaffolded practices (Hutto and Myin 2013: 152). 
                                                             
19 According to this definition, the claim that cognitive processing involves the use of public repre-
sentational systems or the production of personal-level representing mental acts that consist in 
the internalization of public representations is not a representationalist claim. 
20 A synonym for “made out of natural content” is “intrinsically having content”: the possession of 
content by physical vehicles does not depend on the existence of linguistic, representational or 
symbolic human practices. “Intrinsically” does not mean here “non-relational”. 
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To put it otherwise: radical enactivism claims that cognition never involves 
mental representations made out of natural content. This is an idea that is 
radical enough for serving here as a starting point for defining the clearest 
current form of enactive anti-representationalism. Radical enactivism is now 
sufficiently radical when it is compared with classical internalist versions of 
representationalism for which mental representation necessarily have intra-
cranial vehicles carrying natural content, and with “extended mind” and oth-
er enactive versions of representationalism for which there may be mental 
representations (intracranially located or not) made out of natural content 
(besides other types of mental representations, including public-language rep-
resentations and external representations). If we define representationalism 
as a claim being about representations endowed with natural or intrinsic con-
tent, the radicality of radical enactivism can appear in the following table: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
In this paper, I wish to clarify and to assess some arguments proponents of 
enactivism (radical or not) have proposed in their criticism of representation-
alism (in the narrow sense just defined above). This will first require a set of 
distinctions about the targets and the forms of enactive anti-representatio-
nalism (section I). I will then proceed by rehearsing two classical strategies 
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against representationalism that the enactivist tradition has exploited but that 
can also be found in other traditions (section II), before presenting two more 
radical and specific anti-representationalist strategies that I see as being more 
proper to the enactivist tradition (section III). Still, these two latter strategies 
might pose no problems for a marginal yet existing version of representation-
alism, according to which mental representations do not essentially have con-
tent and intentionality (section IV). This resistance of a marginal version of 
representationalism to the (proclaimed) radicality of enactive anti-
representationalism will absolutely not be considered here as a refutation or 
dismissal of the latter. On the contrary, it will be seen as an opportunity—in 
section V—to identify some common assumption(s) that enactive anti-
representationalism and classical representationalism might share, but also to 
invite enactivist anti-representationalists to (re)consider the conditions by 
which theoretical terms may be eliminated (or retained) in science.  
Allow me to end this introductory section with a personal note: I am writing 
here from a (global) anti-representationalist stance (defended in other pa-
pers)21; I will definitely not present here a critique of representationalism, or a 
defense of anti-representationalism. My aim here is to describe the scene from 
which enactive anti-representationalism has been and is currently enacted. 
This description is a requisite for a better understanding, refinement, but also 
possible criticism of enactive anti-representationalism. 
 
I. Situating anti-representationalism 
In order to precisely define the various forms of enactive anti-represen-
tationalism, it is necessary to situate them among a broader Spielraum defined 
by at least twenty-four possible positions (don’t worry: only twelve of them 
will be actually considered!). These twenty-four positions are constructed out 
of the combinations between the choices that can be made when one is facing 
three main alternatives: an alternative between positions (representational-
ism vs. non-(or anti-) representationalism); an alternative between the stances 
from which these positions are defended (methodological vs. ontological); and 
an alternative between the scopes of these positions (local vs. basic vs. global). 
I have presented above preliminary definitions of representationalism and 
anti-representationalism: it is now time to sharpen them. But let me remind 
you that all these clarifications and distinctions will be made from a common 
starting point: representationalism as a claim about the existence of physical 
structures endowed with natural or intrinsic content and playing a role in 
cognitive processing. 
                                                             
21 See Steiner (2010) for a critique of representationalism and a defense of anti-
representationalism; Steiner (2014) for a critique of extended-mind representationalism; and 
Steiner (2011) for a defense of enactive anti-representationalism. 
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A very basic distinction is classically drawn between methodological and onto-
logical versions of representationalism and anti-representationalism22. Onto-
logical versions explicitly take issue with the reality of mental representa-
tions. Ontological representationalism considers that mental representations 
exist, whereas ontological anti-representationalism denies their existence. 
A methodological version is agnostic on the issue of the reality of mental rep-
resentations: they are not taken as literally existing (we may not be warranted 
in positively asserting their reality). Still, methodological representationalism 
argues that mental representations (and their manipulation, manufacture or 
retrieval) must necessarily be posited for the explanation or prediction of the 
performances of cognitive systems; whereas methodological non-represen-
tationalism argues that they do not need to be invoked (it is possible to posit 
them, but there are more helpful theoretical posits). In both methodological 
stances, nothing ontological is inferred from the presence or the absence of 
the concept “mental representation” in successful explanatory and predictive 
practices (methodological representationalism includes “fictionalism” about 
mental representations (Sprevak, 2013)). Methodological versions of represen-
tationalism and anti-representationalism may be said to be anti-realist in 
the following sense: they deny that theories involving the positing (or the non-
positing) of mental representations are truth-conditioned descriptions of 
their intended domain (observable and unobservable), and that their predic-
tive or explanatory successes entail that the entities they posit have “real” 
counterparts.  
Methodological non-representationalism is not a variety of anti-represen-
tationalism, since it basically makes no use of the concept “mental representa-
tion”. In itself, it is not against the existence of mental representations: it may 
consider that the ontological debate between representationalism and anti-
representationalism is vain, for instance because of a lack of clear definition 
of what a representational property is23. Anti-representa-tionalism is more 
demanding and challenging than non-representationalism, since it explicitly 
claims that mental representations do not exist. 
The endorsement of an ontological position does not force one to make 
a choice concerning a particular methodological commitment: both ontologi-
cal representationalism and anti-representationalism are compatible with 
both methodological representationalism and non-representationalism, but 
also with the attitude of having no commitment at all towards the methodolo-
gy of cognitive science. And conversely: methodological commitments may be 
independent of ontological commitments and interests. Still, one may combine 
                                                             
22 See Chemero (2000) for this distinction (but I use the term “methodological” where Chemero 
used “epistemological”). 
23 See Haselager et alii. (2003). 
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an ontological position with a methodological position, and thus endorse at 
the same time both an ontological and a methodological position. 
We thus have eight possible positions: 
– Ontological representationalism; 
– Methodological representationalism (which I will denote hereafter by 
“methodological representationalism”); 
– Ontological representationalism with methodological representationalism 
(which I will denote hereafter by “representationalism”); 
– Ontological anti-representationalism; 
– Methodological non-representationalism (which I will denote hereafter by 
“methodological representationalism”); 
– Ontological anti-representationalism with methodological non-
representationalism (which I will denote hereafter by “anti-
representationalism”); 
– Ontological representationalism with methodological non-representatio-
nalism: one accepts that mental representations exist, but consider that scien-
tific models should better do without the concept of “mental representation”. 
– Ontological anti-representationalism with methodological representational-
ism: one accepts that mental representations do not exist, but still holds that 
they are our best ways to capture and explain the complexity of cognitive be-
haviour. 
In ontological representationalism and in ontological anti-representatio-
nalism, one does not want to infer methodological consequences from the 
ontological position, or does not want to ground this ontological position on 
methodological commitments. In methodological representationalism and 
methodological non-representationalism, one defends a claim concerning the 
methodology of cognitive science, but does not want this methodological 
choice to interfere with ontological issues. 
The scope of each of these eight positions can be global, basic or local. 
The position is global when it applies to every cognitive system and every cog-
nitive part of it (operations and subsystems such as faculties). It is basic when 
it applies to most cognitive systems, operations and subsystems. And it is local 
when it only applies to the particular cognitive system, operations or subsys-
tem under consideration. 
We thus have twenty-four (8 x 3) different positions. I will focus on what I 
consider as being the twelve most notable positions. Indeed, for obvious rea-
sons of space but also of relevance, I leave aside global, basic and local ver-
sions of ontological representationalism and anti-representationalism: in the 
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philosophy of cognitive science, there are not many scholars who defend onto-
logical representationalism or anti-representationalism only, not aggregating 
them with methodological commitments or suggestions. Ontological represen-
tationalism and anti-representationalism are almost always included as com-
ponents of what I call here “representationalism” and “anti-representatio-
nalism”, which also include methodological commitments. I also leave aside 
global, basic and local versions of conjunctions of ontological representation-
alism with methodological non-representationalism, and of ontological anti-
representationalism with methodological representationalism. These versions 
are quite rare in the literature, and it is hoped that the reader will be able to 
define them from the statements given above. This leaves us with 12 positions, 
which we will now examine one-by-one. 
(1) Global representationalism: Every cognitive system and every cogni-
tive part of it (operations and subsystems such as faculties) involves the use, 
the retrieval or the manufacture of mental representations (as made out of 
natural content), so that bona fide models of every system, operations or sub-
system as cognitive system, operations or subsystem must appeal to the con-
cept of “mental representation”—for descriptive, predictive and explanatory 
purposes. 
(2) Basic representationalism: Most cognitive systems, operations and 
subsystems include the use, the retrieval or the manufacture of mental repre-
sentations (as made out of natural content), but there might be cognitive sys-
tems, sub-systems and operations that do not include mental representations 
(made out of natural content or not): models of these systems, operations or 
sub-systems as cognitive systems, operations or subsystems do not need to 
appeal to the concept of “mental representation” for descriptive, predictive 
and explanatory purposes. 
(3) Local representationalism: the cognitive system, operations or sub-
system under consideration includes the use, the retrieval or the manufacture 
of mental representations (as made out of natural content), so that bona fide 
models of this system, operations or sub-system as cognitive system, opera-
tions or subsystem must appeal to the concept of “mental representation” for 
descriptive, predictive and explanatory purposes. 
All these cases of representationalism are composed of ontological representa-
tionalism with methodological representationalism. Mental representations 
are here contentful (information-carrying) physical structures that have a real 
ontological and explanatory status. Their content is a natural product that 
allows them to refer to some object, property or state of affairs. According to 
this definition, external (public and/or shareable) representations such as 
models, images or natural language sentences are not mental representations: 
one can be a critic of representationalism without denying the existence and 
the cognitive importance of external representations. Representationalism is 
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here a claim about the reality of the property “being a mental representation 
of X”: it is not only about its heuristic relevance for describing and explaining 
the mechanisms of cognition. Representationalism, as we define it here, is a 
very general claim, that includes many variations: one can find a version of 
representationalism for which all mental representations are necessarily 
symbols in a language of thought (Fodor, 1987, chap.1 and appendix), or a 
version of representationalism for which cognition must be defined as a set of 
operations having the function of building mental representations of envi-
ronmental phenomena (in that version, the property of mental representation 
is used for defining the explanandum, and not only the explanantia of cogni-
tive science). These two versions of representationalism can be criticized, 
amended or even rejected by other versions of representationalism (for in-
stance: parallel and sub-symbolic distributed processing vs. the symbolic con-
ception; action-oriented conceptions of cognition and representation vs. the 
idea of cognition as a mirror of the environment ; mental representations as 
maps, models or pictures vs. mental representations as propositional sets of 
symbols…). Global representationalism does not necessarily link the cognitive 
character of a system to the presence of mental representations: it just asserts 
that from some level of study and analysis of cognitive systems, it is necessary 
to acknowledge the existence of mental representations, without assuming 
that they correspond perfectly to what would be described at another level of 
analysis of these same systems. Still, global representationalism considers that 
explaining the cognitive properties of cognitive systems requires the appeal to 
mental representations.  
Vehicle-internalist and cognitivist theories of cognition are not the exclusive 
owners of representationalism. On the contrary: many versions of extended, 
distributed or situated cognition may endorse basic representationalism. For 
most proponents of extended cognition, even if there may be cases or aspects 
of extended cognitive processing that do not (just) involve mental representa-
tions as made out of natural content and thus that do not require representa-
tionalist explanations, the existence of mental representations (for instance 
realized in intracranial and subpersonal processes) and the necessity of refer-
ring to them when one tries to explain a great variety of cognitive phenomena 
are not at issue24. Unlike classical AI representations, these representations do 
not need to be complete, inert, propositional, denotational, action- and percep-
tion-neutral, stable, complex, detailed, digital, discrete, amodal, syntactically 
structured, or symbolic. Mental representations can be built and used on the 
fly; they can be modal (even when they are categorical), minimal (content-
sparse), superposed, partial, action-oriented, context-dependent, embodied, 
analogue, distributed, or sub-symbolic. Basic representationalism is more 
                                                             
24 See for instance Clark (2008: 19, 26, &153); Menary (2007: 58–59 & 69); Rowlands (2010, chapter 
5); Sutton (2010: 197); Wheeler (2005, chapter 8); and Wilson (2004, chapter 8). 
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plastic and flexible than global representationalism: it easily tolerates the ex-
istence of cognitive phenomena that are not representational (and that do not 
deserve representational explanation). While position (1) is rather endorsed 
by standard versions of the cognitivist theory, post-cognitivist theories that 
insist on the pragmatic, environmental, embodied or situated dimensions of 
cognition by retaining representationalism generally endorse basic represen-
tationalism. 
(4) Global methodological representationalism: Bona fide models of every 
system, operation and subsystem as cognitive systems, operations or subsys-
tems must appeal to the concept of “mental representation” for predictive or 
explanatory purposes. 
(5) Basic methodological representationalism: Bona fide models of most 
systems, operations and subsystems as cognitive systems, operations and sub-
systems must appeal to the concept of “mental representation” for predictive 
or explanatory purposes, but there might be systems, operations and subsys-
tems whose cognitive properties can be explained or predicted without ap-
pealing to the concept “mental representation”. 
(6) Local methodological representationalism: Bona fide models of this 
system, operation or sub-system as cognitive system, operation or subsystem 
must appeal to the concept “mental representation” for predictive or explana-
tory purposes. 
It is important to note that methodological representationalism may accept 
that there might be non-representationalist descriptions of cognitive systems: 
it will just argue that, when it comes to explanation and to (interesting) pre-
dictions, the ascription of mental representations (as made out of natural con-
tent) is the only possible way (globally, basically or locally). Methodological 
representationalism is well exemplified in the daily practices of many re-
searchers in cognitive science: the use of the concept “mental representation” 
is considered as being absolutely required for describing, predicting and ex-
plaining studied phenomena as cognitive phenomena, but nobody will dare to 
enter into ontological considerations by asserting that mental representations 
exist (or not). That is, the endorsement of methodological representationalism 
carries no commitment to the existence or non-existence of mental represen-
tations. 
I mentioned above that methodological versions of representationalism (and 
anti-representationalism) were anti-realist towards the property “being a 
mental representation”. There are different kinds of anti-realism: instrumen-
talism, but also pragmatism, phenomenalism, interpretationism, constructive 
empiricism, fictionalism and idealism, to name but a few. The combination of 
methodological representationalism with each of these versions of anti-
realism can foster complex and subtle versions of methodological representa-
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tionalism. For some of them, methodological representationalism is necessary 
(this is the version presented here), for other versions, it is only a better posi-
tion than non-representationalism, and for other versions, both representa-
tionalism and non-representationalism are possible (and efficient) ways of 
describing, explaining or predicting the behaviour of cognitive systems. De-
pending on the kind of anti-realist commitments one assumes when methodo-
logical representationalism is endorsed, mental representations can have dif-
ferent status: they can be conceived as models, fictions, useful falsehoods, 
explanatory tools, instruments of calculation, descriptive labels,... In any case, 
if the concept “mental representation” is a representation, it is not a represen-
tation of an object “out there”, but a part of a representational system such as 
a theory, whose main purpose is not describe or to represent what there is in 
an unobservable domain, but rather to predict and/or to explain the behav-
iour of cognitive systems. Mental representations are not constituents of cog-
nitive systems; they are constituted in and by scientific practices and theories. 
The fact one posits mental representations—and not nails, flies or cucum-
bers—for achieving predicting and explanatory purposes can be explained—
but not justified—by mentioning how it is often comforting to rely on repre-
sentational systems such as language for modeling and defining thought and 
its intentionality (Sellars 1956, § 50-52, and § 57-58 is a central reference on 
this topic). 
 (7) Global non-representationalism: Bona fide models of every system, 
operation and subsystem as cognitive system, operation and subsystem do not 
need to appeal to mental representations (as made out of natural content), for 
descriptive, predictive and explanatory purposes. 
(8) Basic non-representationalism: Bona fide models of most systems, op-
erations and subsystems as cognitive systems, operations and subsystems do 
not need to appeal to mental representations (as made out of natural content), 
for descriptive, predictive and explanatory purposes, but there might be sys-
tems, operations or subsystems whose cognitive properties need to be de-
scribed, explained, or predicted by appealing to mental representations. 
(9) Local non-representationalism: Bona fide models of this system, oper-
ation or sub-system as cognitive system, operation or subsystem do not need 
to appeal to the concept “mental representation” for descriptive, predictive 
and explanatory purposes. 
The three cases of non-representationalism are not symmetrical with the 
three cases of methodological representationalism, since methodological rep-
resentationalisms express a necessity in the form of a normative claim (“one 
must appeal to the concept of ‘mental representation’”) while non-
representationalisms deny this necessity without implying that non-
representationalist models and explanations should automatically be pre-
ferred to representationalist models and explanations. And remember that 
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non-representationalism do not claim that representationalist explanations 
are mistaken. It just holds that they can be dispensed with (globally, basically 
or locally). 
(10) Global anti-representationalism: There are no mental representa-
tions (understood as physical structures having natural content), so that (a) 
cognitive systems, operations and sub-systems do not include the use, the re-
trieval or manufacture of mental representations and (b) bona fide models of 
systems, operations and subsystems as cognitive should not appeal to mental 
representations (and thus use the concept “mental representation”) for de-
scriptive, predictive and explanatory purposes. 
(11) Basic anti-representationalism. Most cognitive systems, operations 
and subsystems do not include the use, retrieval or manufacture of mental 
representations, so that bona fide models of these systems, operations and 
subsystems as cognitive should not appeal to mental representations (and 
thus use the concept “mental representation”) for descriptive, predictive and 
explanatory purposes. 
(12) Local anti-representationalism: the cognitive system, operations or 
subsystem under consideration does not include the use, the retrieval or the 
manufacture of mental representations (as physical structures having natural 
content), so that bona fide models of this system, operations or sub-system as 
cognitive system, operations or subsystem should not appeal to mental repre-
sentations (and so should not use the concept “mental representation”) for 
descriptive, predictive and explanatory purposes. 
Since representationalism and anti-representationalism result from a con-
junction of ontological and methodological positions, each of these latter posi-
tions can partially support representationalism and anti-representationalism 
Global representationalism and global anti-representationalism are more 
than methodological positions, and concern every cognitive system: empirical 
statements and examples will not be sufficient for justifying them. Moreover, 
global, basic and local versions of anti-representationalism include ontological 
claims on the non-reality of mental representations. These ontological claims 
will be conceptual, not empirical, for one cannot ask to the proponent of anti-
representationalism to empirically show that mental representations do not 
exist25. But anti-representationalisms also include methodological compo-
nents: arguments related to the possibility of non-representational explanato-
ry practices in cognitive science can partially justify them. 
                                                             
25 Indeed, an existential claim such as “There are mental representations” could only be falsified 
by a negative existential claim such as “There are no mental representations”. But a negative 
existential claim is a universal claim, and these claims cannot be empirically confirmed (see Pop-
per 1959, chap. 3, section 15 for that classical point). 
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Ontological representationalism is included in representationalism: a local 
version of ontological representationalism (or a local version of representa-
tionalism) can be used for refuting global versions of ontological anti-repre-
sentationalism or global versions of anti-representationalism. Indeed, the 
simple observation of a mental representation is sufficient to refute the claim 
that they do not exist. But in order for the observation of a mental representa-
tion to refute global ontological anti-representationalism, it is first of all nec-
essary to define the necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of a 
mental representation, which is not at all obvious if one takes into account the 
various debates inside of representationalism itself.  
Any local version of representationalism is compatible with local or basic ver-
sions of anti-representationalism (or non-representationalism), and any local 
version of anti-representationalism is compatible with local or basic versions 
of representationalism (ontological and methodological, or methodological 
only). Those who endorse these aggregated positions will often hold that rep-
resentationalism and anti-representationalism can be, or even have to be, 
complementary approaches. It is only for global versions that representation-
alism and anti-representationalism are contradictory approaches.  
Now that these (hopefully) clarifying distinctions have been made, we can ask: 
what kind of anti-representationalism can we find in the enactive literature? 
First, let us recall that none of these positions can suffice for defining enactiv-
ism, since enactivism is not only a claim about the representational (or non-
representational) properties of cognitive systems. Answering two other ques-
tions may help in answering the question raised above. 
 (A) Among the six different versions of representationalism (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6), which version(s) does enactivism reject? 
(B) Among the six different versions of anti-representationalism (7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, and 12), which version(s) does enactivism endorse?  
Of course, the answer given to (A) will depend on the answer given to (B), and 
conversely. 
One can identify at least three broad trends in the current enactive literature 
concerning the ontological and the explanatory status of mental representa-
tions:  
The first trend is an explicitly eliminativist trend, consisting in the explicit 
defence of global anti-representationalism, and thus in the complete rejection 
of all the six versions of representationalism, ontological and methodological. 
Hutto and Myin’s radical enactivism is here a landmark. The battle against 
representationalism is here engaged on two fronts: an ontological front (men-
tal representations as made out of natural content do not exist), and a meth-
odological front (non-representationalist explanations are possible and should 
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be favored). But we must keep in mind that radical enactivism is not “really 
radical enactivism”: radical enactivism accepts that some classes of cognitive 
phenomena exhibit representational properties, but these representational 
properties necessarily depend on the existence of sociocultural practices (rep-
resentational properties are not natural properties). Since radical enactivism 
denies the very existence of natural content, it is coherent here to define it as 
defending a global version of anti-representationalism (as we have defined it). 
The second trend is a conservative trend, rejecting (1), (2), (4) and (5) by en-
dorsing (8) or (11). There is thus non-representationalism or even anti-
representationalism here, but conceding that some forms of mental represen-
tations (as made out of natural content, and possibly realized in subpersonal 
and intracranial processes) may exist and/or that representationalist explana-
tions may be required in some cases of cognition, like for instance anticipa-
tion, abstraction, imagination, or memory. Conservative enactivism is thus 
compatible with (3) and (6). Conservative enactivists will here insist that these 
mental representations are not symbolic, static, abstract or detailed, but they 
will endorse representationalism. I have mentioned Evan Thompson’s and 
Alva Noë’s acceptances of some forms of representationalism in the introduc-
tory section. John Stewart also endorses a version of what I call here “con-
servative trend” when he suggests that 
 "Constructivist representations", if I may call them that, cannot of course repre-
sent referential states of affairs in the external objective world (as in computa-
tionalism). I consider, however, that they can (...) represent the anticipated con-
sequences of an organism's actions for its future perceptions. Armed with rep-
resentations of this sort, an organism can set itself a "goal" (expressed in terms 
of a desired perceptual configuration), and then by purely mental activity (with-
out having to take the risks involved in proceeding by trial and error by actually 
acting in the world) elaborate a sequence of actions which, according to these 
representations, can be expected to achieve that goal (...). Representations as 
thus defined are thus the basis for intentional action. (Stewart 1996, III.5). 
The author ably criticizes and rejects mental representations as they figure in 
a computational and objectivist theory of cognition, but accepts that the enac-
tive theory (equated with a constructivist approach) can harbour other types 
of mental representations (presumably endowed with natural content, since 
the author does not mention some necessary dependence between mental 
representations and socio-cultural practices) . Since it is quite easy to find 
versions of representationalism that reject or are agnostic on the metaphysi-
cal debate between objectivism and constructivism (Clark 1997: 173) and/or 
that do not endorse the computational theory of mind, one can understand 
why this conservation of some types of mental representations is a type of 
(local) representationalism.  
The conservative trend faces at least two dangers: first, the proponents of 
basic representationalism (be it ontological and methodological or methodo-
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logical only) can argue that the cognitive phenomena “conservative enactiv-
ists” agree to define or to model in a representationalist way are actually so 
pervasive or fundamental in our cognitive life that the enactivist should ac-
cept, by implication, that our cognitive life is basically representational (in 
Stewart’s case: are not intentional actions pervasive in our cognitive life?). 
Conservative enactivism will then slowly but surely slide from local represen-
tationalism (compatible with basic anti-representationalism), be it (9) or (12), 
to basic representationalism (which is incompatible with basic anti-
representationalism), be it (8) or (11). Second, if they are able to stick to local 
representationalism and argue that they endorse basic anti-represen-tatio-
nalism, conservative enactivists need to explain why they endorse basic anti-
representationalism. Eliminativist arguments on any kind of mental represen-
tations as they are developed by or for global anti-representationalism (onto-
logical and methodological, or methodological only) will not be available to 
them, since conservative enactivists agree to see that some mental representa-
tions (as having natural content) exist (or should be taken as existing, for ex-
planatory purposes). Conservative enactivists will need to carefully decom-
pose the architecture of cognitive functions in order to state where and how 
mental representations exist (or should be posited as existing) and where and 
how they do not exist. This option for criticizing representationalism is possi-
ble, of course, but is trickier and less encompassing than the roads which are 
taken by global anti-representationalism and non-representationalism. 
But the very possibility of the conservative trend (that is, the fact that some 
enactivists are ready to embrace it) may also reveal a shortcoming of the elim-
inativist trend: the need of retaining a representationalist vocabulary for ex-
plaining anticipation (for example) may be due to the current non-availability 
of other (non-representational) concepts in the toolbox of global anti-
representationalism or non-representationalism. Or, alternatively, the propo-
nent of the conservative trend may consider that the non-representational 
concepts anti-representationalists or non-representationalists want to intro-
duce in place of representational concepts are currently not adequate for de-
scribing or explaining the cognitive phenomenon under question, and notably 
their intracranial and subpersonal components.  
The last trend in the enactive literature is a practically eliminativist trend, en-
dorsing global methodological non-representationalism without embracing 
global anti-representationalism: the aim of this trend here is to move forward 
by developing applications of non-representationalism, leaving ontological 
controversies on mental representations behind. The proponent of the agnos-
tic trend does not claim that mental representations or the representationalist 
language should be eliminated in enactive cognitive science; he may just be 
indifferent to the issue of representationalism. Spending time criticizing rep-
resentationalism, as an explanatory commitment or as an ontological stance, 
would already be giving too much importance to classical cognitive science. 
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According to this trend, it by its practical fruits that non-representationalism 
must be considered and defended, not by the criticism of representationalism. 
An example of such an attitude can be found in Chemero’s (non-enactive) non-
representationalism (for which non-representationalist explanations are not 
only possible, but also better than representationalist explanations): 
“Refrain from arguing that cognitive systems really are not representational; 
instead, argue that the best way to understand cognition is with the tools of 
dynamical systems theory, by taking up what I have called the dynamical 
stance. The best way to argue for the fruitfulness of the dynamical stance is by 
example; get to work providing non-representational explanations of cogni-
tive phenomena that are both convincing and sufficiently rich in their impli-
cations to guide further research” (2000: 646; author’s emphasis). 
Replace here “dynamical systems theory” by “autopoietic enactivism” and 
“dynamical stance” by “enactive stance” and you get a practically eliminativist 
trend in enactivism (of course, the resources of dynamical systems theory may 
be integrated in enactivism, and conversely). Note that this option is only 
a distinct option if one claims (or believes) that non-representationalism is 
globally possible. A restriction of its scope would lead to the conservative 
trend (for instance, to position 8).  
To sum up: the absence of the concept “mental representation” in an enactive 
theory does not necessarily entail global anti-representationalism. Every time 
a proponent of enactivism develops a model of some cognitive phenomenon 
without using a representationalist vocabulary, he might be doing so for dif-
ferent reasons or from different hypothesis: he may endorse the eliminativist 
trend of anti-representationalism, and thus global anti-representationalism; 
he may endorse basic anti-representationalism, and thus be disposed to en-
dorse the representationalist idiom in order to account for some cognitive 
phenomena; or he may be indifferent to the representationalism vs. anti-
representationalism debate, and rather committed to the attempt of account-
ing for cognitive phenomena in general with a non-representationalist vocab-
ulary, at best by implicitly endorsing a global non-representationalist com-
mitment (option 3). The proponent of the practically eliminativist trend might 
refuse to make explicit his ontological commitments on the issue of mental 
representations… because he might have no commitments on that topic! In 
this latter sense, it is possible that the proponent of the practically eliminativ-
ist line has no desire to build a systematic anti-representationalist theory: 
non-representationalism in action is enough.  
The existence of these three trends within enactivism is both normal and 
problematic. It is normal, for it would be naive (and even dangerous) to ex-
pect too much homogeneity from enactivism. There are different ways of em-
bracing the computational theory of mind or distributed cognition: why 
would that be different for enactivism? But it is also problematic, for these 
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three different trends exemplify different potential (and often current) ten-
sions within enactivism, which may weaken its unified criticism of other the-
ories. For instance, the conservative trend implicitly disagrees with the explic-
itly eliminativist trend: it accepts neither the scope of its conclusion nor its 
main ontological claim… for this ontological claim rules out the very existence 
of the mental representations the conservative trend wants to retain. The 
practically eliminativist trend might object that the explicitly eliminativist 
trend is losing time by explicitly criticizing a lost cause (ontological represen-
tationalism): it should only focus on practical work (the practical development 
of methodological non-representationalism). The conservative trend can also 
accuse the practically eliminativist trend of not providing satisfying alterna-
tives to representationalist tools, but it can also be accused—by eliminativ-
ists—of conceding too much to representationalism. All of this means that one 
of the next important challenges of enactivism is not the criticism or the rejec-
tion of representationalism per se, but the clarification of how and why repre-
sentationalism should be criticized, abandoned… or retained (let us also not 
forget that “really radical enactivism” can also be a contender in the debate !).  
I have said above that it would be naive (and even dangerous) to expect too 
much homogeneity from enactivism. Besides, the various arguments put for-
ward by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in The Embodied Mind against represen-
tationalism were already difficult to classify. The book certainly included a 
rejection of the symbolic model of mental representation and a rejection of 
the idea that the concept of “mental representation” is and should be funda-
mental in cognitive science (see for instance 1991: 9). But this seems to be a 
version of (11), namely basic anti-representationalism. True, in enactive cog-
nition, “representations no longer play a central role” (1991: 207)… but, there-
fore—and by pure deduction—they still play a role! Still, in other places, a 
rejection of any version (symbolic, connectionist,…) of representationalism is 
expressed, so that representation is not only non-fundamental: it is to be re-
fused. For instance, after having written that they accept the mundane sense 
of “represent” as expressing a referential property external items (sentences, 
maps,…) have, the authors criticize a stronger sense of “represent” as it is used 
for characterizing cognitive activity: 
This strong sense arises when we generalize on the basis of the weaker idea to 
construct a full-fledged theory of how perception, language, or cognition in gen-
eral must work. The ontological and epistemological commitments are basically 
twofold: We assume that the world is pregiven, that its features can be specified 
prior to any cognitive activity. Then to explain the relation between this cogni-
tive activity and a pregiven world, we hypothesize the existence of mental rep-
resentations inside the cognitive system (whether these be images, symbols, or 
subsymbolic patterns of activity distributed across a network does not matter 
for the moment). We then have a full-fledged theory that says (1) the world is 
pregiven; (2) our cognition is of this world-even if only to a partial extent, and 
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(3) the way in which we cognize this pregiven world is to represent its features 
and then act on the basis of these representations. (1991: 135) 
The authors, here, do not criticize global representationalism (and the five 
other versions of representationalism) in general: they criticize global repre-
sentationalism (and the five other versions of representationalism) as embed-
ded in some objectivist ontology (see their clauses (1) and (2)). But it is perfectly 
possible to endorse representationalism without endorsing an objectivist on-
tology (that is, without endorsing these clauses (1) and (2)). It is not uncom-
mon to read proponents of representationalism arguing that their representa-
tionalism, as a hypothesis on the causal and subpersonal mechanicisms of 
cognition, is totally neutral or agnostic in the debate between idealism and 
realism, or between objectivism and constructivism (see for instance Clark 
1997: 173). And there is also the possibility of having non-representationalism 
with realism (Zahidi 2014). 
Be that as it may, before The Embodied Mind, Varela had proposed another 
argument against global representationalism, clearly pointing to the en-
dorsement of the explicitly eliminativist trend described above. I will present 
and develop this argument in section III. For now, after having clarified in this 
section the various targets and positions of enactive anti-representationalism, 
I would like to present four basic strategies that we can find in the enactive 
literature and that make it possible for enactivists to defend anti-
representationalist and non-representationalist positions—and especially the 
eliminativist trends. These strategies are often interrelated, and they can be 
cumulated. In the next section, I briefly present the philosophical strategy and 
the explanatory strategy. Section III will deal with the ontological strategy and 
with the epistemological strategy (the one defended by Varela (with Maturana) 
before The Embodied Mind).  
 
II. Philosophical and explanatory strategies against representationalism 
Depending on its scope of application (global, basic or local), the philosophical 
anti-representationalist strategy can support (10), (11), or (12), since it is a 
strategy against ontological representationalism. This strategy consists in ar-
guing that “mental representation” is the wrong conceptual unit for defining 
the cognitive relations which take place between cognizing (or perceiving,…) 
organisms and their environments. This strategy is based on considerations 
on the (alleged) nature of cognition (if one endorses anti-representationalism 
for cognition in general), of perception (if one endorses anti-represen-
tationalism for perception) or of reasoning (if one endorses anti-representatio-
nalism for reasoning), etc.., and more precisely on the (alleged) nature of their 
intentionality. Many philosophers, from John Dewey, Martin Heidegger, Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Lévinas to Hubert 
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Dreyfus, Charles Taylor, Hilary Putnam, Robert Brandom, John McDowell or 
Charles Travis have developed non-representationalist approaches of concep-
tual, perceptual, doxastic or epistemic intentionality. The philosophical strate-
gy that enactivism can deploy (and has deployed) against representationalism 
often relies on the works of some of these authors (see for instance Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch 1991). Nevertheless, this strategy is not without certain 
defects. The main potential problem seems to be the following: this strategy is 
based on philosophical considerations about intentionality, cognition, 
knowledge or reasoning as personal-level phenomena. These considerations 
do not seem to entail a rejection of representationalism as a definition of what 
makes these phenomena causally possible on a subpersonal level26. On the 
contrary: representationalism, as a hypothesis concerning the existence of 
subpersonal (and possibly intracranial) mental representations endowed with 
natural content, may always be invoked for explaining for instance how per-
sonal-level perception, cognition or intentionality is for action or develops 
from practical coping or embodiment. This philosophical strategy may also be 
closer to really radical enactivism than to radical enactivism: the works of the 
philosophers mentioned above may include criticisms of the idea that non-
basic forms of cognition involve representational content, even if the latter 
one is defined from social, linguistic or cultural resources. 
The explanatory strategy against representationalism consists in arguing that 
it is not necessary to posit the existence of mental representations and to use 
the concept “mental representation” when one wants to explain the opera-
tions that make cognition possible. We have other explanatory resources 
which do not involve or presuppose an appeal to representational properties 
(Calvo Garzon 2008). We here find the grounds of the 7th, 8th and 9th versions of 
non-representationalism defined above, since the explanatory strategy is ba-
sically against methodological representationalism. Those grounds can there-
fore also partially justify global and basic anti-representationalisms: indeed, 
they will justify its methodological components. This strategy will also only 
partially justify global non-representationalism: the latter position concerns 
all possible cases of cognition, a level of universality that cannot be reached 
by empirical cases and applications of the explanatory strategy.  
Local versions of this explanatory strategy may always be compatible with 
basic and local representationalisms (ontological and methodological, or 
methodological only). In order to demonstrate its viability and its global, basic 
or local scope, this explanatory strategy must provide a sufficient range of 
examples and applications. Its general (or basic) scope will often be achieved 
by accumulating local explanatory or predictive successes. Classical cases, 
today, include the engineering of artificial creatures that work without repre-
                                                             
26 This remark was already made by Rorty (1979: 230-256). 
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sentations at all (and not only explicit representations, as in Brooks’ famous 
case), but also the study of insect cognition (Webb, 1994), developmental pro-
cesses (Thelen & Smith 1994), motor coordination, or perceptual supplementa-
tion (Lenay & Steiner 2010). If there should be an empirically robust basic 
methodological non-representationalism, it will be built out of many cases of 
local methodological representationalism27. But this hypothetical inductive 
generalization is not the only challenge that is encountered by this explanato-
ry strategy against representationalism. Indeed, according to its representa-
tionalist opponents, it must also show that 
(1) the explanatory posits it appeals to for explaining cognitive phenom-
ena do not really have or involve representational or semantic proper-
ties. This requirement applies, for instance, to attractors in a dynamical 
system (Van Gelder 1995; Freeman & Skarda 1990), to coupling relations 
(Chemero 2009), to intentional arc and maximal grip (Dreyfus, 2002), to 
internal control parameters (Keijzer 2001), or to informationally sensi-
tive responsiveness (Hutto & Myin 2013) 
and that 
(2) these non-representational entities play a role in the explanation of 
cognitive behaviours, and not only reflex-like or stimulus-determined 
behaviours (or reflex-like and stimulus-determined parts of cognitive 
behaviours). 
Still, when the proponent of representationalism expresses these two chal-
lenges, he must at least make clear what are, for him, the conditions in virtue 
of which a phenomenon is a representational phenomenon and a cognitive 
phenomenon, and in virtue of which a statement or description constitutes an 
explanation of a cognitive behaviour. Arguing, on a priori grounds, that cogni-
tion is necessarily representational or that any explanation of cognitive phe-
nomena must involve the appeal to mental representations (as made out of 
natural content) would of course entail the victory of the proponent of repre-
sentationalism even before the debate has taken place. Let us also recall that it 
is very easy to turn any non-representational entity or process into a repre-
sentational entity or process. The hard job, for the representationalist, is to 
explain why the representationalist vocabulary is necessary and superior to 
the non-representationalist vocabulary for providing cognitive explanations.  
                                                             
27 Needless to say, representationalists consider on a priori grounds that this challenge is a lost 
cause for the anti-representationalists. For instance, Wilson and Foglia (2011) write: “formulating 
an empirically adequate theory of intelligent behavior without appealing to representations at all 
(…) faces insuperable difficulties, and the idea that it is a relatively trivial matter to scale up from 
existing dynamic models to explain all of cognition remains wishful thinking and subject to just 
the problems that motivated the shift from behaviorism to cognitive science in the first place”.  
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The explanatory strategy can also take the form of an original criticism of rep-
resentationalism made by William Ramsey (2007): for Ramsey, methodological 
non-representationalism is already implicitly dominant in cognitive science, 
in spite of the representationalist propaganda. Indeed, if one pays attention to 
the properties in virtue of which the entities named “mental representations” 
play an explanatory role in many models of cognitive behaviour, one will see 
how much these properties are very rarely representational properties (even 
if the observer can ascribe them semantic properties): these properties are 
more elemental, since they often only take the form of indication, covariation, 
correlation or standing-in. If Ramsey’s arguments are correct, many pro-
claimed “representationalist” explanations of cognitive phenomena are actu-
ally non-representational, and form a set of examples that can be exploited by 
the proponent of explanatory anti-representationalism28. Following Ramsey 
or Gallagher (2008), one can for instance wonder how much the so-called 
“minimal representations” that are defended by proponents of extended cog-
nition like Mike Wheeler or Mark Rowlands are robust enough for having 
representational properties.  
As said above, this explanatory strategy may be invoked for defending (10), 
but does not entail (10) by itself: one can be a methodological non-
representationalist without endorsing ontological anti-representationalism 
(and thus (10)). More fundamentally, (10) is first of all a general position, 
while the cases put forward by the explanatory strategy are first of all local, 
and concern explanatory practices, not ontology. 
I will now focus on two other strategies against representationalism that have 
been developed or are developed by enactivism: the ontological strategy and 
the epistemological strategy. Unlike the philosophical strategy, the ontological 
strategy is about mental representations themselves, and not primarily about 
cognition, perception or knowledge (and their intentionality). Unlike the ex-
planatory strategy, the epistemological strategy entails ontological anti-
representationalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
28 The only entities whose causal role is representational, according to Ramsey, are structural or 
simulational representations. 
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III. Ontological and epistemological strategies 
 against representationalism 
These two strategies support the idea that representational content29 does not 
exist at a natural and subpersonal level, so that—by implication—(naturally) 
contentful physical structures do not exist. These two strategies are sufficient 
for excluding ontological representationalism, but are not sufficient for ruling 
out methodological versions of representationalism: only methodological non-
representationalism (with the help of the explanatory strategy) can do that. In 
the enactive literature, these two strategies are included in global versions of 
anti-representationalism, ontological and methodological. But since these two 
strategies (only) concern the existence of mental representations, they could 
also be embedded in positions such as ontological anti-representationalism 
only, or ontological anti-representationalism with methodological representa-
tionalism (see section II). 
The epistemological argument leads to the ontological elimination of mental 
representations (as made out of natural content) by being based on a consid-
eration of what happens when an observer ascribes representational proper-
ties to an observed brain (be it isolated or embedded in an organ-
ism/environment system). It does not exclude the natural existence of repre-
sentational content from an explanatory point of view (like the explanatory 
strategy), but from considerations on the pragmatics of representationalist 
explanations and descriptions. The conclusion is that it is illusory to put natu-
ral content in the head (the head being a very basic place where natural con-
tent and mental representations may be located, according to the representa-
tionalist orthodoxy). The ontological strategy reaches the conclusion that it is 
hopeless to try to find natural content in the head and, more broadly, in the 
world, from considerations on the problematic place of representational con-
tent in a naturalistic framework. Besides their ontological conclusions (global 
anti-representationalism), these two strategies share the idea that representa-
tional content can only be a product of linguistic and social practices. 
Let us begin by the epistemological strategy. 
The epistemological strategy, as it was notably and clearly deve-
loped by Varela and Maturana in their 1987 book The Tree of Knowledge, 
is derived from the considerations of the authors on the autonomy of living 
systems and on the organizational closure of the central nervous system 
                                                             
29 In what follows, I will use “content”, “representational content” and “semantic content” inter-
changeably. (Representational) content is the content of mental representations. In the represen-
tationalist literature (including the one that is discussed and criticized by anti-
representationalism), this content has semantic properties: it can be true or false, correct or in-
correct; it carries meaning (and not only information). 
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(1987: 253). I  ill not repeat these considerations here, and will instead fo-
cus on their implications for putting forward an epistemological strategy 
against representationalism.  
Pragmatically, what is happening when one observer (a scientist) is using rep-
resentationalism? We have a human person, the observer, facing an organ 
(the brain), or representations or models of the brain (images, data…). The 
observer entertains relations with the environment: he sees, feels, touches or 
converses about objects or states of affairs in the environment. When he con-
verses about objects with his colleagues, he is producing and acting from lin-
guistic contents, said or written in utterances. These linguistic contents nota-
bly exist in virtue of linguistic rules and conventions. The observer may be-
lieve that the brain he is observing entertains the same type of relation to the 
environment as the relations that he has, so that the brain would have cogni-
tive relations with the objects the observer interacts with, by using or produc-
ing contents. But this is an illusion: unless one is under the grip of the preju-
dice that he/she is what his brain is or is doing, there is no reason to think that 
the operations of the brain—a subpersonal organ – and its relations to the 
environment are like our semantic operations and our cognitive relations 
with that environment. True, the brain plays a crucial causal role in the pro-
duction of our cognitive and semantic behaviours, but that does not entail that 
it harbours all the dimensions of this cognitive and semantic behaviour, in-
cluding its objects (as represented) and the linguistic contents from which one 
may think about something. Maturana and Varela indeed write:  
We as observers have access both to the nervous system and to the structure of 
its environment. We can thus describe the behavior of the organism as though it 
arose from the operation of its nervous system with representations of the envi-
ronment or as an expression of some goal-oriented process. These descriptions, 
however, do not reflect the operation of the nervous system itself. They are good 
only for the purpose of communication among ourselves as observers. They are 
inadequate for a scientific explanation. (Maturana & Varela 1987: 132-133) 
Terms such as “representation”, “memory”, “code”, or “information” occur in 
the space of human design and understanding. Their use for describing cere-
bral goings-on dramatically abbreviates and over-interprets dynamical pat-
terns and regularities of biochemical events (Varela 1989: 7-16). Why “dramat-
ically”? Because the observer mistakes the perspective of the brain for his 
very own perspective: he puts in the brain contents that only exist at some 
linguistic and (inter)personal level, and turns these contents into natural enti-
ties. William James already described this drama as follows: 
The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with 
that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call 
this the 'psychologist's fallacy' par excellence. For some of the mischief, here too, 
language is to blame. The psychologist, as we remarked above, stands outside of 
the mental state he speaks of. Both itself and its object are objects for him. Now 
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when it is a cognitive state (percept, thought, concept, etc.), he ordinarily has no 
other way of naming it than as the thought, percept, etc., of that object. He him-
self, meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily led to sup-
pose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in the same way in which he 
knows it, although this is often very far from being the case. (James 1890, vol. 1, 
ch. VII: 196; author’s italics). 
Representationalism consists in the mistake of thinking that the representa-
tionalist idiom (and especially the notion of “content”) is and must be some-
thing more than an idiom that can be trivially used for very metaphorically 
(and grossly) making sense of the brain: it would be the only or the best way 
of doing so, because the brain really harbours the units of this idiom; and 
these intracranial units would naturally represent the environment as we 
know or interact with it. For Maturana and Varela, the brain is not a solipsis-
tic engine: it is an interacting part of the organism, and plays a role in the 
structural coupling of the organism with the environment. But it is not a rep-
resentational engine: it does not relate to the environment as we do, or as ma-
chines that we have conceived do, in virtue of information and instructions 
(1987: 169): 
To an observer, the organism appears as moving proportionately in a changing 
environment; and he speaks of learning. To him, the structural changes that oc-
cur in the nervous system seem to correspond to the circumstances of the inter-
actions of the organism. In terms of the nervous system’s operations, however, 
there is only an ongoing structural drift that follows the course in which, at each 
instant, the structural coupling (adaptation) of the organism to its medium of in-
teraction is conserved. (1987: 170-171).  
Maturana already expressed this epistemological strategy in 1978:  
Representation, meaning, and description are notions that apply only and exclu-
sively to the operation of living systems in a consensual domain, and are defined 
by an observer to refer to second-order consensual behavior. For this reason, 
these notions have no explanatory value for the characterization of the actual 
operation of living systems as autopoietic systems, even though they arise 
through structural coupling. (Maturana, 1978: 50; see also Maturana 1972: 23)  
This argument is close to, but not identical with, a basic anti-represen-
tationalist argument in the Wittgensteinian tradition (see for instance Kenny 
1989, chap. 10; Glock 2008; Descombes 2010; Bennett and Hacker 2003). Ac-
cording to this argument, it is a category mistake to think that natural and 
subpersonal phenomena of covariation or causal dependency could harbour 
or amount to representational or semantic properties. The latter properties 
are necessarily derived from linguistic and social practices, in which sharea-
ble structures (pictures, sentences, models,…) can acquire a representational 
status in virtue of what rule-following agents do and must do with them. The 
existence of mental representations as made out of natural content is here a 
priori excluded from the stipulation of necessary conditions for the existence 
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of semantic content. These conditions will never be satisfied by a brain (even 
if having a brain is a necessary causal condition for being able to participate 
to linguistic and social practices from which representational properties 
emerge). Both sides (Maturana-Varela and the Wittgensteinian side) agree that 
semantic content is a product of interpersonal and normative practices. 
A (inter-)personal-level entity cannot be used as the general blueprint for ex-
planations or descriptions at the subpersonal level. The Wittgensteinian ar-
gument focuses on what brains cannot do so that it is fallacious to ascribe rep-
resentational properties to them, while Varela and Maturana focus more of 
what the observer is doing when he is using the representationalist talk for 
describing the brain, in order to show how representationalism rests on 
an illusion. 
Let me now pass to the ontological strategy, as it has been recently and clearly 
exposed by Hutto and Myin in the chapters 4, 5 and 6 of their book Radicaliz-
ing Enactivism. Basic Minds without Content (in the same book, the authors 
also adopt an explanatory strategy against representationalism, see for in-
stance their chapter 3)30. In these chapters, the authors put forward an onto-
logical argument against representationalism, based on the current failures of 
the various philosophical attempts (Dretske, Millikan, Fodor,…) to naturalize 
representational content. It is well known that ontological representational-
ism has met and still meets many problems: the symbol-grounding problem, 
the problem of the causal efficacy of semantic properties, but also the problem 
of providing a naturalistic account of the content of mental representations. 
Concerning the last problem, Hutto and Myin remind us that neither informa-
tional theories nor teleosemantics are able to provide a satisfactory non-
intentional explanation of the emergence of intentional and semantic proper-
ties (truth-conditionality, reference, intensionality) (the same could be said for 
resemblance-based accounts): either they beg the question by already coming 
with intentional notions, or they merely deliver covariation and indication, 
which are not sufficient for giving semantic or representational content. 
These failures to naturalize content entail that representationalism has no 
foundations in the naturalistic ontology proponents of representationalism 
generally assume. Unable to be integrated in the naturalistic ontology it 
claims to be a part of, the representationalist program would be “plagued with 
toxic debt, financed by loans it cannot pay back” (2013: 160). Since representa-
tional content has no place in a naturalistic ontology, there are good reasons 
to think it does not exist as an entity conveyed or produced by natural pro-
cesses, including subpersonal and intracranial ones. For the author, the con-
tents of our thoughts, imaginings or reasonings are not natural or subpersonal 
contents: they derive from the integration of our cognitive activities in socio-
                                                             
30 See my review (Steiner 2013) of the book. 
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cultural practices (the argument of the authors ultimately converge with the 
Wittgensteinian argument mentioned above). 
 
IV. Do mental representations essentially have contents?  
Some limits of the ontological and epistemological strategies 
It is now time to mention or propose some shortcomings of these two latter 
anti-representationalist strategies. I have said above that these two strategies 
were not sufficient for ruling out methodological representationalism: one 
can agree that naturally-made representational content does not exist or is an 
illusion and yet believe that our best explanatory policies should make use of 
content ascription to the brain (even if we know that nothing makes these 
ascriptions true). This is not an objection to these strategies, since they are 
explicitly (and only) against ontological representationalism.  
These two critical strategies include (but are not restricted to) a common in-
ference, ending with an eliminativist conclusion: 
P1. In the representationalist ontology, the subpersonal and intracranial 
phenomena named “mental representations” naturally (or intrinsically) 
have contents31 
P2. There is no natural (or intrinsic) content at the level of subpersonal 
and intracranial phenomena  
C. Subpersonal and intracranial mental representations, as they are 
conceived by the representationalist ontology, do not exist 
Of course, they will justify P2 differently; this is why they are different strate-
gies: for the epistemological strategy, there is no natural representational con-
tent because it is an illusion or an artifact; for the ontological strategy, there is 
no natural representational content because there is no satisfying naturalist 
account of representational content. Before criticizing this inference and thus 
these two strategies together, let me first express an objection against the jus-
tification of P2 that is proposed by the ontological strategy. Hutto and Myin’s 
ontological strategy starts from a current state of affairs (the failures of at-
tempts to naturalize content), and infer some general truth of it. But the fact 
that content has not been naturalized until now does not mean it is not natu-
ralizable: past failures do not necessarily entail future failures.  
                                                             
31 As said above, for vehicle-internalist versions of representationalism, mental representations 
necessarily consist in intracranial and subpersonal processed endowed with natural content. For 
vehicle-externalist versions, mental representations are not necessarily intracranial or endowed 
with natural content, but some of them are intracranial and endowed with natural content: this is 
the main claim of representationalism as I have defined it in the introduction, and as it figures in 
the premise 1 above. 
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Let me now criticize the general inference as it is endorsed by the ontological 
strategy and by the epistemological strategy. It is more precisely the uncritical 
endorsement of P1 that can be questioned. P1 can be rephrased as follows: “it 
is part of the concept 'mental representation' as it is used by representational-
ists for denoting subpersonal and intracranial processes that mental represen-
tations naturally have contents”. As I have already said in the introductory 
section, the criticism and the demise of representationalism realized by the 
epistemological and by the ontological strategies is thus the criticism and the 
demise of a certain kind of representationalism: representationalism accord-
ing to which mental representations naturally have contents. A representa-
tionalism which would come with the idea that representational content is 
necessarily made out of linguistic and social resources (so that there is no nat-
ural content) would not constitute a target for enactive anti-represen-
tationalism. A different but important debate would be to know to which ex-
tent basic cognition is representational... or not, when by “representational” it 
is now meant “involving the existence of linguistic and symbolic practices”: 
this debate would not be a debate between representationalism and anti-
representationalism as we have defined them in this paper.  
If representationalists deny that mental representations have natural content, 
their representationalism is not a problem for radical enactivism. But they 
may also deny that mental representations have content, while still seeing 
them as natural, subpersonal and intracranial phenomena... now untouched 
by the ontological and the epistemological strategies. Indeed, P1 can be re-
fused by versions of representationalism which consider that mental repre-
sentations should not be modeled on cases of external representations, and 
thus do not entertain referential relations with their objects in virtue of some 
content (be it natural or not). For these versions of representationalism, men-
tal representations, as natural, subpersonal and intracranial phenomena ex-
ist; but they do not have content. Otherwise put: the epistemological and the 
ontological strategies are working if one assumes that the alleged nature of 
mental representations is exhausted by the descriptions one can find in popu-
lar scientific accounts (but also folk accounts) of the term “representation”: in 
these descriptions, representations have contents. But these strategies may 
not work if one considers that the concept “mental representation”, whatever 
our definitions and descriptions of mental representations may be, robustly 
refers to a cluster of properties which are probably very different from the 
properties that are assigned by folk accounts of representations. Before seeing 
how this alternative is possible, let us pause for a moment for seeing that this 
objection is a classical objection that is faced by every kind of eliminativism 
concerning theoretical terms (Stich 1996, chap. 1). Michael Devitt summarizes 
the objection as follows: 
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Consider how, in general, we argue directly for the nonexistence of Fs. On the 
basis of the established view of Fs, we start, implicitly if not explicitly, with an 
assumption about the nature of being F: something would not be an F unless it 
were G; being G is part of the very essence of being F. Then we argue that noth-
ing is G. So, there are no Fs. But suppose that someone responds by denying the 
essentialist assumption upon which the argument rests. ‘Fs do not have to be G, 
they are just mistakenly thought to be G. So the argument proves nothing’ (2009: 
57; author’s emphasis). 
A typical eliminativist argument proceeds as follows: a theoretical term T re-
fers to whatever entities satisfy a description (or a cluster of descriptions) 
generally associated with the term in a theory (the meanings of theoretical 
terms are defined by reference to causal roles specified by the theory). If noth-
ing satisfies this description (i.e. if nothing instantiates the causal roles de-
fined by the theory), there are good reasons to think that the theoretical term 
does not refer to anything (and not only that the theory is false): hence the 
justified fates of the terms “phlogiston”, “crystalline spheres”, “caloric”, “ae-
ther”... and maybe “mental representation” in the history of science. This line 
of reasoning assumes a descriptivist theory of reference, according to which 
the reference of a term is determined by the descriptions associated with the 
term. But once one endorses a causal theory of reference, things get a little bit 
more complicated. A descriptivist theory of reference is very suitable for ex-
plaining why theoretical terms of the past have been abandoned, but may fail 
for explaining how some theoretical terms have been retained throughout 
history in spite of massive changes of meaning. According to a causal theory 
of reference, the reference of a term is not a matter of senses or descriptions, 
but of a causal-historical chain between the term and its referent. The descrip-
tions associated with a term may be false, and yet the term might refer to 
some event or property. A term might refer to something whose key proper-
ties are not the ones mentioned in its current intension. The causal theory of 
reference easily explains why terms such as “planet”, “atom” or “gene” have 
been correctly maintained (and not eliminated) in the course of history even 
though their meanings (and the theories they have been included in) have 
deeply changed. Why should it not also be the case for the concept “mental 
representation” as used for denoting a natural, intracranial and subperso-
nal phenomenon?  
What are the conditions in virtue of which one can say that some entity or 
property does not exist, rather than say that it exists, although it is very dif-
ferent from what one thought and thinks about it? What are the conditions in 
virtue of which some term does not refer to anything, rather than referring to 
something which is very different from what the descriptions associated with 
it prescribe? There is no definite answer(s) to these questions: a consideration 
of the properties of the theory in which the term is defined may be crucial, but 
these properties can be and have been very different from case to case. The 
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result (that is, the elimination or the conservation of the term) can derive 
from the fact the theory is seen as true or false, too simple or too complicated, 
necessary (being the only game in town) or useless, reducible or not to a new 
theory… but it can also be generated by social and pragmatic factors. It is very 
easy to assert, ex post facto, that eliminated scientific concepts had to be elim-
inated because right from the start, nothing corresponded to them. But at the 
time of the controversy between their proponents and their opponents, this 
alleged absence of reference was exactly the disputed issue: it was a disputed 
argument, not an undisputed conclusion. What firstly motivated the effective 
elimination of (pseudo)scientific concepts was generally not the inexistence of 
their referents (how could something inexistent make by itself a causal differ-
ence?), and not only the availability and the relevance of other concepts (“ox-
ygen” over “phlogiston” for instance), for the concepts that finally became 
eliminated were available and theoretically relevant: it was also a set of inter-
ests, purposes and institutional factors which increasingly led to their elimina-
tion. A classical proponent of eliminativism, Patricia Churchland, was clearly 
aware of the heterogeneity of the causes that can contribute—or not—to the 
elimination of a theory or of a theoretical term when she wrote that 
The whim of the central investigators, the degree to which confusion will result 
from retention of the old terms, the desire to preserve or to break with past hab-
its of thought, the related opportunities for publicizing the theory, cadging 
grants, and attracting disciples all enter into decisions concerning whether to 
claim identities and therewith retention or whether to make the more radical 
claim of displacement. (Churchland 1986: 283-284).  
Knowing that there is no historical law or methodological rules that would 
allow us to directly infer the elimination of a term from the failure of the the-
ory (or of the description) in which (or with which) it is defined, proponents of 
anti-representationalism should not think that the demise of natural repre-
sentational content entails the end of mental representations as natural enti-
ties. The concept “mental representation” might actually refer to entities 
without content and be retained in spite of massive semantic changes. This is 
not a vague theoretical possibility: this change of perspective is already in 
place if we consider some minor (yet existing) versions of representational-
ism. 
Taking into account (like Hutto & Myin!) the massive failure of attempts to 
propose a naturalization of the semantic relation that is supposed to exist be-
tween mental representations and environmental facts and properties, Dan 
Lloyd has proposed to consider the property of mental representation as a 
monadic property:  
Every attempt to express the relation of representation in non-represen-tational 
terms has failed to meet the constraints of content, being either too short in 
range or too wide in focus. If neither dyadic nor polyadic relations are adequate 
for the task, then it is perhaps time for a proposal of last resort: what if repre-
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sentation is not a relational property at all, but rather a monadic, nonrelational 
property? (Lloyd 2003: 938).  
This definitional move is already sufficient for not being shaken by Hutto and 
Myin’s criticism of representationalism, since the latter criticism assumes that 
the concept of “mental representation” refers to a dyadic (at least) property. 
Mental representations, here, are not relational properties: they do not refer 
to anything. The requirement of naturalizing their referential or intentional 
dimension is therefore dropped off.  
But one can go further, and defend representationalism by getting rid of the 
very reality of content (at least as a reference-enabling entity). As France Egan 
(2010) has clearly suggested, most versions of representationalism endorse 
what she calls the “Essential distal content view”, made of the three following 
commitments: 
1. Mental representations are distally interpreted: they are about objects 
and properties in the environment. 
2. Computational states and processes are type-individuated with refer-
ence to these distal objects and properties32  
3. The relation between mental representations and the distal objects 
and properties to which they are mapped is a substantive, naturalistical-
ly specifiable relation. 
Based on the analysis of Marr’s theory of early vision and on a computational 
theory of motor control, Egan (2014) suggests that it is possible to endorse rep-
resentationalism without endorsing these three commitments: distally-
defined content does not need to play an individuating and a causal role in 
computational models of cognitive tasks. But it might still have an explanatory 
role. Its ascription to some internal states would be necessary for explaining 
how a computational process is the exercise of a cognitive capacity: 
A semantic interpretation of a computational mechanism is necessary to explain 
how a formally characterized process, in a certain context (say, when connected 
to certain performance systems, or situated in a certain external environment) 
constitutes the exercise of a cognitive capacity, such as computing the depth of 
the scene, or the syntactic structure of an acoustic input. (Egan, 2003: 100; au-
thor’s emphasis).  
                                                             
32 This second commitment shows that Egan defines these commitments as belonging to the com-
putational tradition. I propose here to attribute these commitments to other representationalist 
traditions as well. This can be done by rephrasing the second commitment into “distal objects and 
properties are mentioned in order to type-individuate most cognitive states and processes”. 
 
AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
75 
 
Egan’s proposal is both progressive and conservative: progressive, in so far as 
she argues that distal content does not have causal and individuating roles in 
computational models of cognitive processing. For this reason, her version of 
representationalism avoids most of the criticisms of the ontological and of the 
epistemological strategies: the relation between mental representations and 
distal objects is not a real and naturalistically specifiable relation, since distal 
content is ascribed to these mental representations. This ascription of distal 
content is based on the fact these internal states and structures co-vary with 
environmental properties and facts; but these states and structures do not 
represent their normal distal cause (Egan, 2010: 257). Still, Egan’s position is 
conservative with respect to the notion of content: even unreal (that is, not 
grounded on a natural relation, and not having a causal and individuating 
role) and defined as the product of an ascription, content must be retained33. 
It is the ascription of content which defines what a cognitive mechanism or 
task is. (The ascription of) content is therefore methodologically necessary. 
Mental representations exist (they are not ascribed), although their content is 
(only) ascribed: the explanatory strategy can criticize the latter claim, while 
the ontological strategies seen above cannot attack the first claim.  
Chomsky is much more radical than Egan, by defending the idea that content 
tout court, including the concept of “content”, has no place at all in cognitive 
science34. Indeed, for a long time now, Chomsky is convinced that folk and 
philosophical notions like “content”, “intentionality” and “reference” have no 
place at all in a naturalistic framework dedicated to the understanding of 
cognitive faculties. There is thus no need to discuss the current failures of 
attempts to naturalize representational content for dropping out content in 
the definition of mental representations: 
The central problem that troubles me is this. I do not know of any notion of 
‘representational content’ that is clear enough to be invoked in accounts of how 
internal computational systems enter into the life of the organism. And to the 
extent that I can grasp what is intended, it seems to be very questionable that it 
points to a profitable path to pursue. (Chomsky 2003a: 274).  
To be an Intentional Realist, it would seem, is about as reasonable as being a 
Desk- or Sound-of-Language- or Cat- or Matter-Realist; not that there are no such 
things as desks, etc., but that in the domain where questions of realism arise in 
a serious way, in the context of the search for laws of nature, objects are not 
conceived from the peculiar perspectives provided by concepts of common-
sense. (…) Intentional phenomena relate to people and what they do as viewed 
                                                             
33 Of course, Egan’s criticism of content as a distally defined entity leaves intact the possibility that 
narrow content exists. 
34 See also Jackendoff (1992, chap. 8) for a similar (and developed) claim and, of course, Stich’s 
(1983, chap.8) claim that psychology (under the form of a syntactic theory of the mind) has no 
need to postulate content, semantic properties or truth conditions.  
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from the standpoint of human interests and unreflective thought, and thus will 
not (so viewed) fall within naturalistic theory, which seeks to set such factors 
aside. Like falling bodies, or the heavens, or liquids, a “particular intentional 
phenomenon” may be associated with some amorphous region in a highly intri-
cate and shifting space of human interests and concerns. But these are not ap-
propriate concepts for naturalistic inquiry (...). If 'cognitive science' is taken to 
be concerned with intentional attribution, it may turn out to be an interesting 
pursuit (as literature is), but is not likely to provide explanatory theory or to be 
integrated into the natural sciences. (Chomsky 2000: 21-23). 
Hutto & Myin might well agree with Chomsky when he writes that “natural-
istic inquiry will always fall short of intentionality” (2000: 45); but whereas 
they will take this as a good argument for eliminating mental representation 
as made out of natural content, Chomsky will take it as a good reason for di-
vorcing mental representations from content and intentionality. Content is 
not defined by functional role or reduced to formal properties, and it does not 
play any causal or explanatory role, for there is no content here, even conceived 
as “narrow content”. The assumption that mental representations have con-
tent is, from a naturalistic point of view, a useless and eccentric assumption. 
Any ontological, epistemological, philosophical or explanatory query concern-
ing content will not be a problem for Chomsky’s representationalism. This 
variety of representationalism is immune to the accusation of resting upon an 
epistemological fallacy and to the accusation of resting upon a non-existent 
naturalistic theory of content. For Chomsky, mental representations are indi-
viduated from their role in cognitive processing. The functional roles of men-
tal representations are here related to properties that have nothing to do with 
content, truth conditions, reference, or intentionality. Their important proper-
ties are formal or syntactic. These formal and syntactical properties are suffi-
cient for individuating and studying the causal role of these representations in 
cognitive processing. These representations do not mean or represent any-
thing; defining their reference is of no scientific interest: 
The internalist study of language also speaks of “representations” of various 
kinds, including phonetic and semantic representations at the “interface” with 
other systems. But here too we need not ponder what is represented, seeking 
some objective construction from sounds or things. (…) Accessed by perfor-
mance systems, the internal representations of language enter into interpreta-
tion, thought, and action, but there is no reason to seek any other relation to the 
world, as might be suggested by a well-known philosophical tradition and inap-
propriate analogies from informal usage. (Chomsky 1995: 53 ; my emphasis). 
“Informal usage”, here, means the very widespread tendency to embrace 
a linguistic model of mental representations, assuming they have semantic 
content or truth conditions, like daily linguistic products. The proponent of 
contentless representationalism, here, wants to sever the ties between the 
explanatory posits of cognitive science and our folk understanding of what 
representations are, but considers that the very term of “representation” can 
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still be applied for describing the natural, intracranial and subpersonal reality 
he is studying (even though its meaning, in scientific inquiry, is very different 
from our daily conceptions). Contentless representations entertain functional 
relations with external phenomena: they occur when and only when the or-
ganism interacts or deals with these external phenomena. In this sense, a 
“number-representation” is a representation of a different functional type 
than a “face-representation”, but is not to be defined as a representation of an 
external item. But—and pace Egan—content-ascription is not a necessary 
methodological stance. At the very best, content-ascription can play some aux-
iliary role in the informal presentation of a computational theory, but not 
within the computational model itself (Jacob 2010: 231): 
There is no meaningful question about the “content” of the internal representa-
tions of a person seeing a cube under the conditions of the experiments, or if the 
retina is stimulated by a rotating cube, or by a video of a rotating cube; or about 
the content of a frog’s “representation of” a fly or of a moving dot in the stand-
ard experimental studies of frog vision. No notion like “content,” or “representa-
tion of” figures within the theory, so there are no answers to be given as to their 
nature. (Chomsky 1995: 52).  
Chomsky’s representationalism aims at doing without content (hence my use 
of “contentless representationalism” for naming this version of representa-
tionalism) 35. Some commentators like Georges Rey (2003a, 2003b) have ar-
gued that his clarifications of what he consequently meant by “representa-
tion” could not escape reference to intentional properties, and thus content. 
For instance, there are places in which Chomsky equates “represent” with 
“implement” (2003: 276): of course, this definition saves “representation” from 
referential properties, but seems to presuppose that some intentionally char-
acterized item—that is, content!—is implemented. This is an instructive de-
bate I will not consider here. More broadly, as said in the introduction, I do 
not consider at all that contentless representationalism is a refutation of enac-
tive anti-representationalism, so that we should embrace or develop it. It is 
enough for the purpose of this section to note that contentless representation-
alism is immune to the criticisms made by proponents of the ontological and 
the epistemological strategies against representationalism, since it does not 
rest upon the assumption that natural (and especially intracranial and sub-
personal) representational content exists, or that its ascription is necessary. 
A table may be helpful here in order to underline the differences between 
contentless representationalism, representationalism, and enactive represen-
tationalism, but also some common points between enactive anti-
representationalism and classical representationalism: as said from the intro-
ductory section, enactive anti-representationalism (paradigmatically: Hutto 
                                                             
35 See Collins (2007) who argues that this position has been exemplified by Chomsky since his 
seminal critical review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior in 1959. 
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and Myin’s radical enactivism, and also Maturana and Varela’s criticism of 
representationalism) is against mental representations made out of natural 
content, but not against mental representations having non-natural content: 
content is a product of socio-cultural practices. This criticism of natural con-
tent is enough for understanding how enactive anti-representationalism is 
radical, but we must not overlook the possibility there are proximities be-
tween enactive anti-representationalism and classical representationalism on 
other issues: both sides presuppose that “content” and “representation” stand 
or fall together (if some entity does not have content (be it natural or not), it is 
not a representational entity), and (less importantly) both sides consider that 
content (be it natural or not) can play an explanatory role in cognitive science. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
In the spirit of this paper, I take contentless representationalism as an oppor-
tunity, not to reject, complement or even amend enactive anti-represen-
tationalism, but to reflect on some presuppositions and challenges of enactive 
anti-representationalism. Contentless representationalism invites us to retain 
representationalism (or at least the claim that there are subpersonal and in-
tracranial phenomena that are naturally representational) if and only if we 
accept that mental representations have no content, no truth and satisfaction 
conditions, no reference, no intentionality, and no definitional role for cogni-
tion. The concept “mental representation” is conserved, but its meaning is 
deeply changed. In this sense, contentless representationalism is an alterna-
tive to anti-representationalism, which invites us to abandon the concept 
“mental representation” for describing or modeling natural phenomena such 
as neural processes, since there is no natural content at the level of intracra-
nial and subpersonal structures. Anti-representationalism encourages the use 
of concepts such as indication, covariation, or correlation for defining the ac-
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tivity of neural patterns. Still, for contentless representationalism, it might 
turn out that the concept “mental representation” refers to some kind of inner 
states which are currently described by anti-representationalists with these 
latter concepts. These states have neither content nor intentionality, but play 
a role in enabling the achievement of a cognitive task whose cognitive charac-
ter may be defined by explanatory conventions, or by taking into account the 
integration of the achievement of the task in broader organism-environment 
interactions (if one endorses vehicle-externalism). The proponent of anti-
representationalism will probably object to contentless representationalism: 
“WHY still go on calling these entities ‘representations’ if they do not have 
content, reference or intentionality?” Is not “contentless representation” 
a pure oxymoron, as Hutto & Myin suggest (2013: 84)? Two replies might be 
proposed—I see both of them as pointing towards challenging issues for enac-
tive anti-representationalism: 
1) This question will also be asked by the proponent of content repre-
sentationalism. This fact is revealing: as shown above, enactive anti-repre-
sentationalists and classical representationalists may share a common as-
sumption, the idea that any kind of representation must have content (be it 
natural or non-natural). Both sides agree that (representational) content and 
(representational) vehicle stand or fall together. Quite ironically, (failed) at-
tempts to naturalize content and the ontological and epistemological strategies 
against representationalism could derive from a common confusion: defining 
or eliminating a scientific concept—“mental representation”—from the re-
sources of common sense, where basic cases of representation do have con-
tent. If one makes that confusion, it becomes natural to think that the fate of 
the concept “mental representation” is linked to the fate of “mental content”.  
Anti-representationalist enactivists do not seem to see that there may be sci-
entific changes by which we retain concepts even though the meanings of the 
latter ones are changing. Or, at least, and in better words: they do not accept 
this possibility for the concept of “mental representation” as denoting natural, 
intracranial and subpersonal phenomena. But, in this case, it would be inter-
esting to know why this possibility is refused to “mental representation” while 
it has been accepted for “genes” (Fox-Keller, 2002) or “atoms” (Pullman, 1998): 
their meanings (and the theories they figure in) have deeply changed, and yet 
the concepts (or minimally, the terms) have been retained36. As Paul Griffiths 
                                                             
36 Here is what E.A. Carlon already remarked in 1966: “The gene has been considered to be an 
undefined unit, a unit-character, unit-factor, a factor, an abstract point on a recombination map, a 
three-dimensional segment of an anaphase chromosome, a linear segment of an interphase 
chromosome, a sac of genome’s, a series of near sub-genes, a spherical unit defined by a target 
theory, a dynamic functional quantity of one specific unit, a pseudoallele, a specific chromosome 
segment subject to position effect, a rearrangement within a continuous chromosome molecule, a 
cistron within which fine structure be demonstrated, and a linear segment of nucleic acid specify-
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and Karola Stotz (2007) clearly showed, the changes of meaning of the concept 
“gene” emerged from a dialectics between a structural conception (anchored 
in biochemistry) and a functional conception (based on the observable results 
of hybridization between DNA molecules) of the gene. The search for the low-
er-level mechanisms fulfilling the functional role attributed to the gene led to 
gradual changes in the definition of this functional role: contemporary genes 
are not the fundamental units of mutation, of replication or of recombination; 
and they cannot be identified with DNA-segments that would unequivocally 
“code for” proteins or “determine” phenotypic traits. Various eliminativist 
temptations were fostered during this process of refinement of the functional 
role of the gene with regard to the discovery of its material realization, but the 
concept “gene” was retained (as said above, only naive presentism and real-
ism would lead us to explain that conservation of the concept “gene” by men-
tioning the “real existence of genes”). Contemporary “atoms” are not inde-
structible, indivisible and immutable, and atoms of the same element do not 
necessarily have identical properties and mass. 
Arguing that the concept of “mental representation” should be eliminated 
because—unlike “genes” and “atoms”—it does not refer to anything would be 
begging the question, because this assumption of non-existence is based on 
the idea that natural content does not exist...which is precisely the clause that 
is modified in the new intension of the concept “mental representation”! 
A possibly better answer to the question “why drop the concept ‘mental repre-
sentation’ just because of massive change of meaning?” might be that the con-
cept of “mental representation” has to be connected to our daily, pre-scientific 
concept of “representation” (which essentially includes “content” in its inten-
sion), so that giving up this connection is renouncing to some intelligible con-
cept of “mental representation”. But there is no a priori reason to think that 
concepts proposed in the context of scientific inquiry have to be derived or 
must respect the bounds of common sense (where representations have con-
tent). On the contrary: one may think that the autonomy of these concepts is 
the best guarantee for avoiding the fallacies correctly diagnosed and criticized 
by Varela & Maturana,… and by Chomsky: using concepts such as “content” 
with their common sense meaning for describing and explaining intracranial 
and subpersonal processes, as so many forms of representationalism do. But 
once this diagnosis is made, nothing forces scientists (like Chomsky) not to use 
concepts by changing their meanings, cutting all ties with common sense (for 
instance: mental representations with no content)37. Only ordinary-language 
                                                                                                                                                             
ing structural or regulatory product” (Carlson E.A., The Gene: A Critical History, Philadelph-
ia/London, Saunders, 1966: 259 ; quoted by Burian 1985: 5)) 
37 Godfrey-Smith (2004: 159) suggests: “When a cognitive scientist works on mental representa-
tion, what we often find is a special kind of meeting two conceptual frameworks and mindsets (…) 
We should think of the ‘representational’ concepts used in cognitive science as amalgams, or 
hybrids, born of the interaction between the ordinary interpretative habits that cognitive scien-
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foundationalism can lead us to think that if scientists use concepts that are 
formally identical with the concepts of common-sense (like “space”, “life”, 
“mass”, “negative charge”, “matter”, “field” and “representation”) then these 
scientific concepts must have and keep the same meaning as the concepts of 
common sense, even if this raises the risk of committing category mistakes (at 
the benefit of armchair critiques of scientific theories).  
2) Instead of “contentless representations’, anti-representationalist en-
activism will encourage the use of other concepts, such as “indication”, “in-
formationally sensitive responsiveness” “covariation”, or “correlation” for 
describing what occurs at the natural, subpersonal and intracranial level of 
cognitive processing. Semantically and logically, there are all the differences 
in the world between these concepts and “representation”, if “representation” 
comes with the very idea of content. Still, pragmatically—if one considers the 
contexts and the functions of their uses –, all these concepts will be analogous 
to representational concepts such as “mental representation” or “information-
carrying structures” as long as anti-representationalists do not state how the 
use of these concepts should be embedded in new ways of building and assessing 
cognitive explananda and explanantia, especially those pertaining to neural 
processes. Otherwise put: it would be very naive to suppose that changing a 
word for another is equivalent to a conceptual change: concepts, their mean-
ings and their uses are always embedded in theoretical enterprises, interests 
and programs. Changing the word “represent” for another word (“indicate”, 
“is correlated with”, “is informationally sensitive to”,…) without changing the 
theoretical context is not a conceptual change; it is just a linguistic trick. The 
proponent of anti-representationalism may legitimately object to contentless 
representationalism that one does not see the point of retaining the concept of 
“representation” once it has undergone so many semantic changes; but the 
proponent of contentless representationalism may also legitimately reply that 
the anti-representationalist is guilty of not providing a sufficiently clear alter-
native to the use of the concept “representation”, beyond a mere change of 
words. As long as we will not be able to imagine how we can do cognitive (and 
especially neural) science in a non-representationalist framework, it is unlike-
ly non-representational words will be able to perform a real non-
representational job. We know that ‘representation’ is not a neutral word: it 
                                                                                                                                                             
tists have just in virtue of being people, and the scientific aims of describing precise, naturalistic 
and empirically studiable relations between organisms and environments. The representational 
concepts used in cognitive science are products of marriages between folk semantics concepts 
and a family of naturalistic concepts of physical specificity-concepts of connection and directed-
ness that are based on causal, nomic and functional concepts.” (author’s emphasis). What I am 
writing here suggests that the marriage between folk semantics and scientific concepts, in the 
case of representational concepts in cognitive science, has not been and is not an equal marriage: 
folk concepts still wear the trousers. True, mental representations can be subpersonal and non-
conceptual; but they are seen as being necessarily contenful. 
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comes with a specific way of thinking, describing and explaining cognition, 
and more precisely the role of the substrate of these “mental representa-
tions”—namely, the brain—in cognitive processes. Symmetrically, if a new 
word should replace “mental representation”, it must come with new ways of 
thinking, describing and explaining cognition and brain activity. Of course, the 
enactive proponent of anti-representationalism can already provide some 
sketches of radically new theoretical contexts for the use of a non-represen-
tationalist vocabulary: works and developments on autopoiesis, autonomy, 
coupling or sense-making can help framing this context. Reconsidering what 
external representations are, and what cognitive jobs they can do so that we 
may have contentful thoughts in an anti-representationalist framework, 
is also an urgent task38, along with a reconsideration of how the “representa-
tional hunger” of “off-line” and “abstract” cognitive tasks may be satisfied 
(Degenaar and Myin, forthcoming). But, as said at the very beginning of this 
text, enactive anti-representationalism and attempts to construct positively an 
enactive cognitive science are nowadays quite separated. We should only 
hope that this separation is very temporary and contingent. But it is also pos-
sible that this separation is the symptom of the existence of different irreduci-
ble commitments—in the enactive framework—to what is centrally required 
for the overcoming of classical cognitive science. Some might want to develop 
and to refine an explicit eliminativist stance on mental representations, while 
others might think that the age of representation is so over that one should 
not lose one’s time arguing with the past. Even if the first strategy faces 
some theoretical difficulties I have outlined in this paper, I believe it would be 
a mistake to abandon it: I do not see how the second strategy would be a pri-
ori immune against all forms of representationalism. And besides being 
parts of the same research program (namely, enactivism), these two strategies 
can converge on several crucial issues such as the status of meaning and con-
tent in nature (including our second nature), or the theoretical place that 
must be allocated to the brain in the definition and explanation of cogni-
tive processing. 
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